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Abstract
Coercion resistance is one of the most important features of a secure
voting procedure. Recently several coercion resistant voting schemes have
been introduced, and some measures for quantifying the level of the co-
ercion resistance in a voting protocol were defined. Also the relationship
between coercion resistance and privacy in elections has been discussed in
the literature.
In this paper, we take a new approach to coercion resistance from
the point of view of an honest election authority that chooses between
various procedures with different levels of resistance and different imple-
mentation costs. We give a game-based model for an election in which the
authority chooses its strategy against a set of coercers. We also propose
a preliminary analysis of the game in its simplest variant, namely one
where only a single coercer is present. It turns out that, in these simple
games, Stackelberg equilibrium is always more attractive to the society
than Nash equilibrium. This suggests that the society is better off if the
security policy is made open and public, and the authorities commit to it.
1 Introduction
It was recognised early on in the history of voting that ballot privacy is an
essential property of voting systems to counter threats of coercion or vote buy-
ing. More recently, cryptographers and security experts have been looking at
using cryptographic mechanisms to provide voter-verifiability, i.e. the ability
for voters to confirm that their votes are correctly registered and counted. It
strengthens to integrity properties, but, if it is not done carefully can introduce
new threats to ballot secrecy. This lead to the introduction of more sophisti-
cated privacy style notions: receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. The later
is the strongest property and can be defined informally as: a voting system pro-
vides coercion-resistance if the voter always has a strategy to vote as they intend
while appearing to comply with all the coercer’s requirements. The coercer is
assumed to be able to interact with the voter throughout the voting process:
before, during and after.
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After [3], we accept the following meaning of the fundamental concepts:
Privacy: The system cannot reveal how a particular voter voted. Thus, privacy
guarantees that the link between a voter and her vote remains secret.
Receipt-freeness: The voter does not gain any information (a receipt) which
can be used to prove to a coercer that she voted in a certain way.
Coercion-resistance: The voter cannot cooperate with a coercer to prove to
him that she voted in a certain way. Coercion resistance requires that the
coercer cannot become convinced of how the voter has voted, even if the
voter cooperates with him.
Achieving coercion-resistance is extremely challenging, especially in the con-
text of internet and remote voting (e.g. postal). A number of schemes have
been proposed that provide it, but typically this comes at a cost, in partic-
ular in terms of usability. In this paper we take a game theoretic approach
to analyse the trade-offs between the costs of implementing coercion-resistance
mechanisms on the one hand, and the cost to the society in terms of threats to
the legitimacy of the outcome due to coercion attacks.
Unlike most existing papers, we do not propose a new coercion-resistant
voting scheme, nor prove that a scheme is secure in that respect. Instead, we
focus on the context of coercion attempts in e-voting, namely costs and benefits
of involved parties. The main question is: Should the society invest in coercion-
resistant procedures, and if so, in what way?. We do not aim at devising a secure
voting procedure, but rather at exposing conditions under which security of a
procedure is relevant at all.
This work is still at a preliminary stage. We do not represent privacy ex-
plicitly, and we do not investigate its relation to coercion. Instead, we model
the coercion resistance level as a simple scalar, usually indicating how much
effort/cost it would take to break it. Also, our game-theoretic models are ex-
tremely simple: the society’s interests are represented by a single agent that
we call the “election authority”, there is only one coercer in the game, and the
structure of the game (i.e., strategies and their outcomes) are common knowl-
edge among the participants. In fact, this is more of a starting point than a
complete study, but we believe that it offers some interesting insights even at
that stage.
1.1 Related Work
Related work can be roughly divided into 3 strands: definitions of the concept of
coercion resistance (and its relation to privacy), proposals of coercion-resistant
voting procedures, and studies of the context of coercion resistance. The notion
of coercion-resistance was first introduced in [6]. In [3], a formalization of co-
ercion resistance was proposed, and its relation to receipt-freeness and privacy
was studied. [4] gave a formal definition of coercion resistance for the end-to-
end voting schemes. In [7], a game-based cryptographic definition of coercion
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resistance was proposed.1 The same authors added a game-based cryptographic
definition of privacy in [8], and showed that the relationship between privacy and
coercion resistance can be more subtle than it is normally assumed. Finally, [5]
proposed a general framework for specifying different coercion resistance and
receipt freeness properties. The framework uses the process algebra CSP and
is general enough to fit a wide range of definitions and properties given in the
literature for coercion resistance.
The second strand overlaps with the first: [6, 4] all propose voting proto-
cols that satisfy their definitions of coercion resistance while [7] proves coer-
cion resistance of two previously existing protocols. Another coercion-resistant
voting scheme was introduced – and proved – in [1]. Several other papers pro-
posed voting schemes which provably satisfy privacy as an intuitive argument
for coercion-resistance, cf. e.g. [11].
Putting coercion resistance in a broader economic or social context has been,
to our best knowledge, largely left untouched. The only paper in this strand
that we are aware of is [2]. The authors compare two voting systems using
game models, more precisely zero-sum two player games based on attack trees.
Two actions are available for the attacker (performing the attack or not); the
authority is presumably choosing one of the two voting systems. The utility of
the attacker is the expected probability of successful coercion minus the expected
probability of being caught. The value is computed for the two systems using
empirical data. In contrast, we consider a more general game where coercion –
and resistance measures – come at a cost (instead of simply assuming probability
distributions for the possible events), and we look for the rational choices of the
players using game-theoretic solution concepts. We also argue that the coercion
game is not zero-sum, with important consequences for the best policy to be
chosen.
1.2 Structure of the Paper
In this paper, we propose a preliminary game-theoretic analysis in coercion
resistance in voting. The main idea is to model the voting process as a nonco-
operative game [10] between the society and coercers. We begin by proposing a
relatively general model of possible actions and incentives in Section 2. Then, in
Section 3, we assume that there is only one coercer, which is a gross simplifica-
tion but lets us avoid reasoning about the complex interaction between different
coercion attempts. Under this assumption, we look at two specific instances
of the model: one where a perfect coercion-resistance policy is available, and
another one where all coercion resistance measures can be overcome by coercers
if they invest sufficient resources.
Our analysis is based on two game-theoretic solution concepts: Nash equi-
librium [9] and Stackelberg equilibrium. Nash equilibrium corresponds to the
1The definition was game-based in the technical sense, i.e., the security property was
defined as the outcome of an abstract game between the “verifier” and the “adversary” (similar
e.g. to game semantics of mathematical logic). In this paper, we use game models to study
the interaction between the actual participants of the protocol.
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behavior of players that should emerge “organically” when they adapt to the be-
havior observed from the other players over a period of time. Stackelberg equilib-
rium [13], which has become very popular in anti-terrorist security recently [12],
corresponds to a scenario when a designated “leader” commits openly to a se-
lected strategy and thus forces the response from the other players. In all the
games that we consider, Stackelberg equilibria for the society turn out to be
different and more beneficial than Nash equilibria. From this, we conclude that
the authority representing the society should not adapt its policy to what it
expects from the coercer. Instead, it should commit to its Stackelberg policy.
Moreover, if the authority announces its commitment publicly, it forces the co-
ercer to give up coercion attempts. This is because the coercer knows now that
coercion has become unprofitable.
2 Coercion as Noncooperative Game
We begin by presenting our game-based framework for modeling coercion games.
The framework is still preliminary; in particular, we do not give any account
of how actions from different coerces may interfere. This is why we will use
only models with one coercer in our analysis of coercion resistance policies in
Section 3. In a way, the framework presented in this section is more a survey of
postulates on game models of coercion, rather than a concrete model.
2.1 Players and Strategies
Having a set of election candidates Ω = {ω1, ..., ωg} and a set of n voters, we
model the election as a strategic game 〈{A,C1, ..., Cc}, (ΣA,Σ1, ...,Σc), (uA, u1, ..., uc)〉,
with the following ingredients.
Players. A and C1 to Cc are the players in the game. The player A is an
honest election authority on behalf of the society. We assume that the goal
of this player is in line with what we may call ”the good of the society” as a
whole. A has no preference for any of the candidates, and tries to make the
result of the election as similar as possible to the result of the election without
any coercion, i.e when the voters vote only on basis of their own preferences
over the candidates.
Players C1, . . . , Cc represent potential coercers. These players may try to
change the result of the election by threatening or bribing voters in order to make
them vote based on the coercer’s plan, rather than the voters’ own preferences
over the candidates.
Note that we do not represent the voters explicitly as players in the game.
Their interests are globally represented by the preferences of A.
Actions and strategies. ΣA = {α0, ..., αMax} is a set of privacy methods
available to be implemented by the election authority A. It is assumed that α0
represents the case of no privacy. We assume that each αi is more costly to im-
plement (but also more costly to break) than αi−1. Moreover, we will consider
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two interpretations of αMax: one which guarantees that coercion cannot hap-
pen (perfect resistance) and another which does not guarantee that (imperfect
resistance).
Σi = {bi0, ..., bin∗i , ...bini} is the set of actions for the coercer Ci. Each action
specifies the number of voters that the coercer attempts to bribe.2 Thus, bit
represents the attempt of coercer Ci to bribe t voters. The minimal number of
voters that the coercer Ci needs to bribe in order to change the result of the
election in his favour is n∗i , where 0 ≤ n∗i ≤ ni. Note that coercing more than
n∗i voters only increases the cost of coercion without increasing its effectivity,
and it is always strongly dominated for the coercer by bin∗i . Therefore, when
analyzing the model, we will usually omit actions bin∗i+1, . . . , b
i
ni .
Besides pure strategies (i.e., actions), a player can decide to select a mixed
strategy, that is, a randomized choice represented by a probability distribution
over actions. We will denote strategies of player i (be it pure or mixed) by si.
A strategy profile is a combination of strategies from all the players (one per
player). A strategy profile consisting of only pure strategies is sometimes called
an action profile.
2.2 Preferences
Preferences are represented by utility functions over possible combinations of
strategies. For each player, their utility combines several factors. The utility for
the election authority A is defined as uA(σ) = vA(out(σ))−imp(αj)−βAΣct=1kt,
where:
• σ = (αj , b1k1 , ...bckc) ∈ Σ = ΣA × Σ1 × ... × Σc is an action profile, chosen
by the players in the game.
• out : Σ→ Ω gives the result of the election.
• vA : Ω → R gives the value of the election for player A. We assume that
vA(out(αj , b
1
k1
, ..., btkt , ..., b
c
kc
)) ≤ vA(out(αj , b1k1 , ..., btkt′ , ..., bckc)) if kt′ < kt.
It means that bribing one more voter can only decrease the value of the
election for player A. Moreover, vA(out(σ)) = v
∗
A when the result of
the election is the same as its result without coercion, and vA(out(σ)) =
v∗A − A for some A > 0 when the result of the election has changed
because of coercion.
• imp : ΣA → R is the implementation cost function. imp(αj) shows the
cost of applying the privacy method αj for the player A. It is assumed
that imp(α0) = 0, and imp(αt) ≤ imp(αt′) if t < t′.
• The term βAΣct=1kt represents the “corruption damage” to the society due
to coercion attempts. We require that βAΣ
c
t=1ni < σA. In other words,
the society always prefers unsuccessful coercion over successful coercion,
and no coercion attempts over unsuccessful coercion.
2In what follows, we use terms “coerce” and “bribe” interchangeably.
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Likewise, the utility function for the coercer Ci is defined as ui(σ) = vi(out(σ))−
(di(αj) + βi) · ki, where:
• σ = (αj , b1k1 , ...bckc) ∈ Σ = ΣA × Σ1 × ... × Σc is an action profile, chosen
by the players in the game.
• out : Σ→ Ω returns the result of the election, given an action profile.
• vi : Ω→ R is a function that gives the value of the election for the player
Ci. We assume that vi(out(σ)) = v
∗
i when the result of the election is in
favor of the coercer i, and vi(out(σ)) = v
∗
i − i for some i > 0 when the
result of the election is not in favor of the coercer.
• ki is the number of voters that player Ci attempts to coerce.
• βi is the cost of bribing one voter for the player Ci. It is assumed that
this number is constant for any number of bribed voters and for all the
privacy methods used.
• di : ΣA → R is the cost of breaking privacy. More precisely, di(αj)
shows the cost of verifying the vote of one voter by the coercer Ci, when
the privacy method αj is applied. It is assumed that d(α0) = 0, and
d(αt) ≤ d(αt′) if t < t′.
Utility of a mixed strategy profile is defined as the expected value of utility,
assuming that different players randomize independently.
2.3 Solution Concepts: Nash vs. Stackelberg
In game theory, solution concepts are used to define which collective behaviors
(represented by strategy profiles σ = (sA, s1, . . . , sc)) are “rational” and should
(or may) be selected. Different solution concepts correspond to different notions
of rationality – more precisely, to different models of the deliberation process
that leads to selecting one or the other strategy. Our analysis of simple models
of coercion in Section 3 proceeds by comparing the predictions obtained by two
solution concepts: Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium.
Nash equlibrium represents a play which can emerge when players adapt
their choices to what they expect from the other players. Formally, σ is a Nash
equilibrium iff no player can unilaterally change her strategy in σ so that she
increases her utility (the strategies of the other players are assumed to stay the
same). Nash equilibrium often captures the collective behavior which emerges
“organically”, through a sequence of strategy adjustments from different players
that leads to a point when nobody is tempted to change their strategy anymore.
Stackelberg equilibrium represents a rational play in a game with a desig-
nated leader player. The leader has the power to choose her action first. She
also publicly commits to her choice so that the other players are fully aware of
it. Formally, Stackelberg equilibrium is defined as the best response to best re-
sponse. That is, for every strategy si of the leader we find the response resp(si)
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b10 b
1
n∗1
α0 (v
∗
A , v
∗
1 − 1) (v∗A − A − βAn∗1 , v∗1 − β1n∗1)
α1 (v
∗
A − imp(α1) , v∗1 − 1) (v∗A − imp(α1) − βAn∗1 , v∗1 − 1 − n∗1 · (d1(α1) + β1))
Figure 1: Game model for perfect privacy. The Stackelberg equilibrium for the
authority is shown in bold. There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
that maximizes the utilities of the opponents; then, we select the si which max-
imizes ui(si, resp(si)). Additionally, we will use the term Stackelberg minimum
to denote the strategy profile consisting of the leader’s Stackelberg strategy and
the most damaging response of the other players. Intuitively, Stackelberg min-
imum represents the worst that can happen if the leader plays her Stackelberg
strategy without announcing it publicly. If Stackelberg equilibrium and Stackel-
berg minimum coincide, there is no point in the leader’s public commitment to
her Stackelberg strategy. Conversely, when Stackelberg equilibrium is different
from Stackelberg minimum, the leader should minimize the risk of random or
misguided response from the others, and announce her policy publicly.
3 Analyzing Simple Models of Coercion
In this section we look at two simple game models that represent a simplified
view of the social context of coercion. In both cases, we assume that there is
only one coercer. That is, we look at the two-player game that arises between
the society (represented by the election authority A) and the sole coercer C1.
We distinguish two possible settings: with perfect privacy (and hence perfect
coercion resistance) available for A, and the other one, where A can only increase
the cost of breaking the privacy but it cannot rule out the possibility completely.
3.1 Perfect Privacy
The first case that we study, is the situation where only one coercer is acting
in the game, and the election authority has a choice between no privacy and
perfect privacy. In this case the game model is 〈{A,C1}, (ΣA,Σ1), (uA, u1)〉,
in which ΣA = {α0, α1}, where α0 represents no privacy and α1 represents
prefect privacy. As the actions b11 to b
1
n∗1−1 are all dominated by the action b
1
0,
we remove them from the game table. As a result the only actions considered
for the coercer are b10 and b
1
n∗1
. The payoff table for this game is depicted in
Figure 1.
This game has no pure Nash equilibrium. In its mixed Nash equilibrium
the authority chooses “no privacy” with the probability p =
n∗1(d1(α1)+β1)
1+n∗1d1(α1)
, and
the coercer attempts to coerce the voters with the probability q = imp(α1)A .
One way for the authority to improve its utility is bringing the game to the
Stackelberg equilibrium. It can do that by making its commitment to choose α1
public. As a result, the coercer should give up coercion attempts as they only
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b10 b
1
n∗1
α0 (v
∗
A , v
∗
1 − 1) (v∗A − A − βAn∗1 , v∗1 − βn∗1)
αm∗−1 (v∗A − imp(αm∗−1) , v∗1 − 1) (v∗A − imp(αm∗−1) − A − βAn∗1 , v∗1 − n∗1 · (d(αm∗−1) + β))
αm∗ (v
∗
A − imp(αm∗) , v∗1 − 1) (v∗A − imp(αm∗) − A − βAn∗1 , v∗1 − n∗1 · (d(αm∗) + β))
αMax (v
∗
A − imp(αMax) , v∗1 − 1) (v∗A − imp(αMax) − A − βAn∗1 , v∗1 − n∗1 · (d(αMax) + β))
Figure 2: Game model for breakable privacy. The Nash equilibrium is shown in
red, and the Stackelberg equilibrium for the authority is shown in bold
increase the cost with no hope for successful coercion. By using the Stackelberg
equilibrium, the utility of the authority is improved by
imp(α1)βAn
∗
1
A
. Thus, A
has an incentive to select the coercion-resistance policy in advance, without
adapting to the strategy of the coercer.
Moreover, it is easy to see that the Stackelberg equilibrium does not coincide
with Stackelberg minimum (because v∗A − imp(α1) > v∗A − imp(α1) − βAn∗1).
Thus, A is better off when publicly commiting to strategy α1, rather than
keeping the policy secret and risking random response of the coercer.
3.2 Imperfect Privacy
In this case only one coercer is acting in the game, and the election authority
has several choices for the privacy method, none of them providing perfect
protection against coercion. In other words, under all the privacy methods
the coercer is able to coerce successfully, the only difference is how much he
has to pay. The game model is 〈{A,C1}, (ΣA,Σ1), (uA, u1)〉, in which ΣA =
{α0, ..., αMax}. As the authority changes the privacy method from α0 to αMax,
the coercer’s cost of coercing. For a given privacy method α, if v∗1 − 1 is
smaller than v∗1 − n∗1 · (d(α) + β) then the coercer prefers coercing. But it
might be the case that from some privacy method αm on, the cost of coercing
for the coercer is greater than 1. In this case the coercer, although able to
coerce successfully, prefers not to attempt coercion in the election. We assume
that, among the available privacy methods, the coercer prefers to coerce when
the privacy method is among α0 to αm−1, and prefers not to coerce when the
privacy method is among αm to αMax. In other words for αi,m ≤ i ≤ Max,
we have (v∗1 − 1) ≥ (v∗1 − n∗1 · (d(αi) + β)). In consequence, it is sufficient to
consider only b10, b
1
n∗1
as the available actions of the coercer. The resulting payoff
table is depicted in Figure 2.
This game has a unique pure Nash equilibrium in (α0, b
1
n∗1
). In this equilib-
rium, the coercer attempts to coerce enough voters, and the authority chooses
the zero-level privacy policy. This can hardly be seen as a socially desirable
outcome of the election. Like in the previous game, we observe that the author-
ity’s Stackelberg equilibrium is strictly more beneficial to the society than the
Nash equilibrium. Thus, if the authority commits to the privacy policy αm∗ and
makes this commitment public, such that the coercer believes the commitment
of the authority to use αm, the coercer chooses b
1
0. By using the Stackelberg
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strategy, the authority improves its utility by A + βAn
∗
1 − imp(αm). Note also
that the Stackelberg equilibrium is again different from Stackelberg minimum.
This suggests that even if the authority chooses a privacy method which is dif-
ficult enough to break, such that the coercers should not attempt to coerce,
the authority can only benefit from that when it makes its decision public and
makes the coercers know its choice and believe in its commitment.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we look at simple game-theoretic models of coercion resistance
in voting procedures. Elections are modeled as two-person non-zero-sum non-
cooperative games, where one player represents the society and the other a
potential coercer in the election. The work is still preliminary, and the models
are arguably too simple. Still, even at this stage some interesting patterns can
be observed. Most importantly, we show that in all games that we consider,
Stackelberg equilibrium is different from Nash equilibrium. In other words, it
is in the interest of the society not to adapt to the expected strategy of the
coercer. Rather, the society should decide on its coercion-resistance policy in
advance. Moreover, the Stackelberg equilibrium does not coincide with Stackel-
berg minimum, which suggests that the society will benefit from announcing its
policy openly. This way, the coercer is best off when refraining from coercion
altogether.
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